"A Brief Biography of the Life of His Eminence Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran." khamenei.ir.10 July 2006. Institute for Preserving and Publishing Works by Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. 31 Oct. 2007 < http://www.khamenei.ir/EN/home.jsp >.
This is a website I found using google. It was built and maintained by a institute in the Iranian government and as such alot of the information I found in it I consider unreliable. It is a website on the Supreme Leader of Iran. He is essentially a shadowy dictator. The man behind the curtain. Most of what we see is the President, Mahamoud Ahmadinejad. The supreme leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, is a heavy religious figure as his title of Ayatollah implies and he has a history with the Islamic Revolution serving under Khomenei. What I ended up picking out of the biography were statements of his activities with the Revolution as I figured they would be reasonably trueful. One thing I read that struck me in the biography, and which really pushed home to me the fact that this is a big propoganda website, was a sentence equating satanic activities to American.
Khamenei, Sayyed. "Ayatollah Sayyed Khamenei's Statement."25 Feb. 2006. Aspiring Shia. 1 Nov. 2007 < http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-IjbSK44icqKEbe9dJuBBUbA-?cq=1&p=42 >.
This is a speach that the Iranian Supreme Leader gave last year comenting on fighting that occured in Iraq which affected two holy Shiite shrines. I found this source backed up alot of things I found elseware. Particularly, Khamenei's anti Western and Israel leanings game out in the speach. He never refers to the U.S. directly instead refering to us as "occupying power" or "dominance seeking powers." In his speach the Ayatollah does call on Muslims not to combat each other and he states that Muslims should not be fighting Muslims. It's interesting seeing these words which came out of the horses mouth. When I look at pictures of the Ayatollah you might think he was just a sweet old Grandpa when in reality he is a Islamic revolutionary with a heavy background in military force and anti American leanings.
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Saturday, October 27, 2007
D9HW7 Deadline Reflection
This week was pretty crazy. It was the first time I was really forced to pull my head out of research gathering and start to think about how I'm going to fit it all together. The biggest difficulty I found was putting it in the format of a pursuasive essay as opposed to an encyclopedia on the wide variety of topics I've been looking at. What it finally came down to was I looked at my research question, "Based on the Current Situation in Iran; What Are Some of The Likely Outcomes, And How Will They Effect The American People?” All my research has been into the first part, the current situation. This weeks assignments forced me to take a comprehensive look at everything I'd gathered and start putting it together into the second part of my question; what are the likely outcomes and how will they effect the American people. I realized that though I could go on forever about the various factors that make up the current situation that wouldn't really answer my research question. The format I finally settled on was going straight into what I think is likely to happen and what it will result in and using the current situation to explain my reasoning. Looking at other people's blogs and replying to them helped me get an idea of how my classmates were dealing with similar issues. I looked primarily at their outlines as that gave me the best overall view on how they were structuring their arguments.
I replied to:
Kathy Lacey
D#9, HW#6 Outline
Jared Zucker
D9, HW6, Outline
Coralee Harding
D#9, HW#6, Outline
Stephann Parizek
D9HW6 Outline Info
I replied to:
Kathy Lacey
D#9, HW#6 Outline
Jared Zucker
D9, HW6, Outline
Coralee Harding
D#9, HW#6, Outline
Stephann Parizek
D9HW6 Outline Info
D9HW4 Outline
I. Introduction
II. Two Basic Possibilities
1. Military Conflict
A. Likely Causes
- Hard Evidence of Iranian Foul play
• Specifically either evidence of nuclear weapons development or evidence linking top Iranian officials to support of terrorist groups in Iraq and else ware
• Hard evidence would give U.S. ability to muster U.N. and other support
- Lack of communication allows situation to deteriorate
• Currently U.S. and many other nations are largely refusing to meet with Iranian officials until they suspend uranium enrichment.
• Both sides getting more and more fed up with each other will eventually lead to conflict. No talking= conflict.
- Small scale strikes spiral out of control
• Troop buildup occurring in Persian Gulf preparing for possible military strikes. Same is happening on Iranian side
• Iran states they will return any aggression
• If punches start flying things will get out of hand and the region will be drawn into conflict
B. Likely Occurrences
- U.N. and Arabic Nations will likely stay largely out of conflict unless evidence of severe hard play
• GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) wary of Iran but warier of joining a conflict which could destabilize the region. In the event of conflict will likely hunker down and hold on for the ride.
• U.N., while more united than usual, still suffers from splits on this issue primarily due to Russia and China’s close economic ties to Iran. U.N. military operations have rarely worked out well.
- Primary reliance on U.S. troops and resources
• Without large-scale assistance from U.N. or other Arabic states the conflict will likely rely on U.S. with perhaps some assistance from coalition and possibly EU or NATO.
• If just a brief conflict could be fine but if turns into longer, larger scale situation like Iraq it will cause problems
- Stretching of U.S. resources
• Still bogged down in Iraq and economy is already suffering. Similar situation in Iran could overstretch our resources.
• Likely large bulk of military would have to be put on deployment until conflict resolved. (Could be years)
• Could result in a draft
- Influx of Insurgents into Iran
• Many middle of the road persons drawn into extremism by massive western based conflict
• Iranian military, specifically Basij and IRGC, geared to fight an insurgency
C. Likely Outcomes
- Both Iraq and Iran Operations likely unsuccessful. Mass pullout. Situation much like Vietnam. All following consequences.
• List various consequences
• Overstretching of military forces and general resources would add up and result in the U.S. pulling out. All other coalition forces would follow.
• Vietnam
- Would result in massively reinforced and funded extremists now free to focus on West.
• Lots of pissed off and angry Arabs, with all their experience, newfound numbers and backing
• Though many would likely be caught up in following struggle many would be available to refocus attacks in Europe and U.S.
- Region likely destabilized.
• Withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces will leave power vacuums, which could result in bloody conflicts.
• Would result in chaos in which terrorism would thrive
D. Important to note
• Possible that coalition occupation in Iran could be shorter and more efficient due to lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
• This is situation as is. Thousand different things.
2. Requirements for Peace
- Open communications and keep them open
• The key to peaceful resolution is open, meaningful talks backed by a threat of violence
• Lack of communication was disastrous in Iraq and would repeat with Iran
• Current situation getting nasty because two sides aren’t talking
- Better border operations
• Sincere joint effort by both governments to secure Iranian border and crack down on weapons
• Stepped up operations to counter Iranian support for insurgencies
- Increased Cooperation
• The Iranian and U.S./Coalition Governments need to work closely to resolve issues
- Sincere effort on both sides to resolve outstanding issues could do wonders
- No observed effort on either side will result in increased perceived conviction of guilt
• Iran isn’t doing something behind our back. If they are it must stop.
- Any hard evidence of Iranian guilt in the areas of nuclear proliferation or insurgent support operations will make everything a new ball game.
- If evidence is found and Iran doesn’t immediately cease said operations then military conflict is pretty much assured.
III. What we need to be doing now.
- Repeat keep communications open
- Stepped Intel operations
• This is almost certainly already being done
• Many difficulties with getting good intel on Iran
• Open communications would likely make intel gathering easier
- Gather resources/allies
• It is critical to be prepared in the case of conflict and the sooner preparations are begun the better
• Efforts are already being made in U.N. and other International organizations
• Gathering support internationally critical to taking some of the burden of U.S. in case of conflict.
- Let everybody do what they do best
• The U.N. is likely our best shot at a watchdog for Iran’s nuclear intentions. The IAEA is pretty much the only inspectors the Iranians will put up with. They do however need to be monitored.
• U.S. and coalition forces need to start operations specifically to counter weapons and support coming into Iraq and Afghanistan from Iran.
- Operations to secure weapons and other support coming across Iranian border
• Specifically U.S. and Iraqi forces
• Iran ally of many parts of current Iraqi government
• Balance needs to reached
• Heavy customs and security operations on Iranian border
• Joint operations preferable
• Perhaps a no man’s zone or security fence
- Watch for hard evidence
• If conflict occurs hard evidence of Iranian foul play could be the key to gathering support for military operations.
• U.N. and Coalition need to focus on their respective areas.
• Critical: hairline trigger. Especially concerning nuclear weapons.
IV. Conclusion
II. Two Basic Possibilities
1. Military Conflict
A. Likely Causes
- Hard Evidence of Iranian Foul play
• Specifically either evidence of nuclear weapons development or evidence linking top Iranian officials to support of terrorist groups in Iraq and else ware
• Hard evidence would give U.S. ability to muster U.N. and other support
- Lack of communication allows situation to deteriorate
• Currently U.S. and many other nations are largely refusing to meet with Iranian officials until they suspend uranium enrichment.
• Both sides getting more and more fed up with each other will eventually lead to conflict. No talking= conflict.
- Small scale strikes spiral out of control
• Troop buildup occurring in Persian Gulf preparing for possible military strikes. Same is happening on Iranian side
• Iran states they will return any aggression
• If punches start flying things will get out of hand and the region will be drawn into conflict
B. Likely Occurrences
- U.N. and Arabic Nations will likely stay largely out of conflict unless evidence of severe hard play
• GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) wary of Iran but warier of joining a conflict which could destabilize the region. In the event of conflict will likely hunker down and hold on for the ride.
• U.N., while more united than usual, still suffers from splits on this issue primarily due to Russia and China’s close economic ties to Iran. U.N. military operations have rarely worked out well.
- Primary reliance on U.S. troops and resources
• Without large-scale assistance from U.N. or other Arabic states the conflict will likely rely on U.S. with perhaps some assistance from coalition and possibly EU or NATO.
• If just a brief conflict could be fine but if turns into longer, larger scale situation like Iraq it will cause problems
- Stretching of U.S. resources
• Still bogged down in Iraq and economy is already suffering. Similar situation in Iran could overstretch our resources.
• Likely large bulk of military would have to be put on deployment until conflict resolved. (Could be years)
• Could result in a draft
- Influx of Insurgents into Iran
• Many middle of the road persons drawn into extremism by massive western based conflict
• Iranian military, specifically Basij and IRGC, geared to fight an insurgency
C. Likely Outcomes
- Both Iraq and Iran Operations likely unsuccessful. Mass pullout. Situation much like Vietnam. All following consequences.
• List various consequences
• Overstretching of military forces and general resources would add up and result in the U.S. pulling out. All other coalition forces would follow.
• Vietnam
- Would result in massively reinforced and funded extremists now free to focus on West.
• Lots of pissed off and angry Arabs, with all their experience, newfound numbers and backing
• Though many would likely be caught up in following struggle many would be available to refocus attacks in Europe and U.S.
- Region likely destabilized.
• Withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces will leave power vacuums, which could result in bloody conflicts.
• Would result in chaos in which terrorism would thrive
D. Important to note
• Possible that coalition occupation in Iran could be shorter and more efficient due to lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
• This is situation as is. Thousand different things.
2. Requirements for Peace
- Open communications and keep them open
• The key to peaceful resolution is open, meaningful talks backed by a threat of violence
• Lack of communication was disastrous in Iraq and would repeat with Iran
• Current situation getting nasty because two sides aren’t talking
- Better border operations
• Sincere joint effort by both governments to secure Iranian border and crack down on weapons
• Stepped up operations to counter Iranian support for insurgencies
- Increased Cooperation
• The Iranian and U.S./Coalition Governments need to work closely to resolve issues
- Sincere effort on both sides to resolve outstanding issues could do wonders
- No observed effort on either side will result in increased perceived conviction of guilt
• Iran isn’t doing something behind our back. If they are it must stop.
- Any hard evidence of Iranian guilt in the areas of nuclear proliferation or insurgent support operations will make everything a new ball game.
- If evidence is found and Iran doesn’t immediately cease said operations then military conflict is pretty much assured.
III. What we need to be doing now.
- Repeat keep communications open
- Stepped Intel operations
• This is almost certainly already being done
• Many difficulties with getting good intel on Iran
• Open communications would likely make intel gathering easier
- Gather resources/allies
• It is critical to be prepared in the case of conflict and the sooner preparations are begun the better
• Efforts are already being made in U.N. and other International organizations
• Gathering support internationally critical to taking some of the burden of U.S. in case of conflict.
- Let everybody do what they do best
• The U.N. is likely our best shot at a watchdog for Iran’s nuclear intentions. The IAEA is pretty much the only inspectors the Iranians will put up with. They do however need to be monitored.
• U.S. and coalition forces need to start operations specifically to counter weapons and support coming into Iraq and Afghanistan from Iran.
- Operations to secure weapons and other support coming across Iranian border
• Specifically U.S. and Iraqi forces
• Iran ally of many parts of current Iraqi government
• Balance needs to reached
• Heavy customs and security operations on Iranian border
• Joint operations preferable
• Perhaps a no man’s zone or security fence
- Watch for hard evidence
• If conflict occurs hard evidence of Iranian foul play could be the key to gathering support for military operations.
• U.N. and Coalition need to focus on their respective areas.
• Critical: hairline trigger. Especially concerning nuclear weapons.
IV. Conclusion
D9HW5 Cluster
I've ragging for awhile on the complexity of the issue I'm dealing with. Now, once again, it has become apparant to me. I've divided my paper into several sections in order to attempt to answer my research question. As I began listing the applicable areas of my research to each one I realized that pretty much every area applied to every section. An international situation like this consists of thousands of factors all interwoven together to create our present day reality. Just a few changes in the weave can have an astounding effect on the reality. As a result as I clustered the information I found that it was hard to pindown just particular areas to use to answer my various questions. I found that the conclusions I was reaching were the result of the combination of my aquired knowledge on the subject. A big theme in my conclusions was simply looking at international politics. I looked at past actions by the U.S., Iran, and the rest of international community and from those made a good deal of my guesses as to what their future actions would be. I also looked into the reasons for their past decisions and from those decided on some ideas as to what could be changed to positively influence their future decisions. Another difficulty that I found was fitting in opposing arguments. I've looked at alot of opposing arguments in my research. The problem I think is that these arguments were on smaller issues and since what I'm doing is pulling together all these small issues to get a look at the big one I'm leaving alot of these arguments in the dust. I'm going to have to take special care throughout my paper to refer to opposing viewpoints wherever I can.
Thursday, October 25, 2007
D9HW6 Research Outline
Current Situation in Iran
I. Iranian Government
A. Structure
Faqih/Supreme Leader (Chief of State) (Essentially elected dictator)
- Must be religious but more importantly politically capable
- Elected by popularly elected religious nationalist “Assembly of Experts”
- Appoints Chief of Judiciary and controls directly
Assembly of Experts (Kind of like electoral college)
- Popularly Elected
- Tested for religious learning and commitment to Islamic Republic
- Must be approved by Guardians Council
President (Replaced Prime Minister) (Second Man) (Public spokesman)
- More power than before
- Subject to faqih in all critical state, security, and foreign policy matters
Guardian Council (just under faqih)
- Religious overseeing council
- 12 appointed (supreme leader) members divided equally between clerics and lay scholars.
- Judicial review and veto power
- Conservative religious watchdog
- Judges the qualifications of those who stand for election to legislative bodies
Discretionary Council
- Resolves disputes between Guardian Council, parliament, and executive branch
- Thirty members appointed by supreme leader
- Resolves issues between ruling powers
• Supreme Leader has enormous power
• Remarkably kin to U.S. in that checks-n-balances and democratic. Chief difference non-separation of church and state and great power to one person.
• Very doubtful anything happens without faqih go ahead or he would crack down on it.
Current Leadership
President → Mahamoud Ahmadinejad
- Extremely anti-West and anti-Israel
- Very overconfident
- May not have support of Iranian government
Current Government
Four Professed Goals at Start
1. Social Justice (opinion)(likely no)
2. Economic Self Sufficiency (failed)
3. Good Economy (opinion/not much change/likely worse)
4. Freedom from Influence of Foreign Powers (Likely succeeding but causes other areas to suffer.
Main View From Revolution: Militant
- Political and cultural revolution
- Theocratic state ruled by and for the clerics
- Violence legitimate means to the ultimate goal
- Supreme Leader
• There are liberal minds which would likely support westernized society but repressed by government.
• Possible Dual reality: Public rigid/Private western
II. Iranian Military
* Roughly Four Branches
* Estimated around 550,000- 600,000
1. Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Established by the clerics, first loyalty to the clerics
- Transformed zealot revolutionary militias into military force accountable only to clerics
• 125,00 Strongish
• Secures revolutionary regime
• Provides training support to terrorist groups abroad
• Formed in 1978 revolution
• Operates independently of Regular Armed Forces (though lots of joint operations)
- Constitution gives IRGC responsibility of “preserving the Revolution”
- Also serves as enforcers for Islamic codes/moralities
- Iranian SS
- Runs certain businesses and social institutions
Military Capabilities
- Consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops (well rounded)
- Air forces negligible, most new aircraft go to regular Air Force
- Navy mostly small guerilla patrol boats
- Political influence as well
* Essentially Iran’s Proxy Training and support force
2. Regular Army
- First loyalty to country and government
- About 350,000
Composition
1. Four Corps
2. Four Armored Divisions
3. Six Infantry Divisions
4. Two commando brigades
5. One Airborne Brigade
6. Other smaller independent formations:
- Several small armor units
- An Infantry Brigade
- An Airborne Brigade
- Two or Three special forces brigades
- Five artillery brigade/regiments
- Coastal defense units
- Air Defense Groups
- Between four and six army aviation units
- Logistics and supply units
- Different organization in each division
- Some not well equipped
- Decent Number of Tanks
- High Number of combat helicopters
3. Iranian Navy
• Smallest service
• About 20,000 men mostly riflemen and marines
• Five Major Zones
1. Three on Persian Gulf (Main)
2. One on Caspian Sea (tiny)
3. One on Indian Ocean
• Three battalions of marines
• Entirely of Foreign Origin
• Largest Hovercraft fleets in the world (shallow Persian Gulf waters)
• Suffered a great deal after withdrawal of Western suppliers (spare parts and maintenance)
• Mostly supplied by Eastern sources now: Russia, China
• Mostly small, high speed boats
• Poorly equipped and largely out of action
• Large number of sea mines
4. Iranian Air Force
• Also hard hit by military sanctions
• Around 100,000 personnel
• Started with decent air force but heavily degraded
• Most planes and equipment come from Russia and China
Defense Industry
• Small: mostly ground force equipment
• Growing Air production
• Still Largely Reliant on Foreign Market
• New turn toward Russia and China markets for arms (big demand)
• All services negatively effected by withdrawal from western resources specifically Air Force and Navy
• Considered Unorganized
• Attempts to make up for lacking areas with good missile and rocket capabilities
• Basij- Essentially National Guard. Trained by Revolutionary Guards so would probably fight like insurgency. Could be very dangerous in an occupation.
Supreme National Security Council
• Institution established with an aim to watch over the Islamic Revolution and safeguard the IRI’s national interests as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Iranian Constitution lays out three responsibilities of SNSC
1. Determine defense/security policies within the framework of general policies laid down by the faqih.
2. Coordinates all activities related to defense/security.
3. Decides how all resources will be used for facing threats (international and domestic.
• President is Chairman of council and subcommittees
• Faqih makes all final calls
Members of SNSC
1. Heads of Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary
2. Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces
3. Official in charge of the Plan an Budget Organization (head treasurer)
4. Two representatives of faqih
5. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Intelligence
6. A minister concerned with the subject and the highest authorities of the Army and the IRGC
• Reports show that military commanders are not idiots and have been known to ignore unsound advice from inexperienced religious/SNSC reps.
• Two chains of command below SNSC
1. Admin
2. Operational
III. Relationship Between Iran And Nearby Countries
Tension with Israel
Reasons
1. Support of Hezbollah
2. Promised Destruction
3. Stated no intention to attack Israel
Recent War Between IDF and Hezbollah
1. Iran emboldened. Seeing tactics work. (Other Arabs see as well)
2. Might be pissed because Hezbollah fired off most rockets
Arab Resentment Toward West
1. Israel
- Basic eviction of Palestinians and emplacement of Israel is very unpopular amongst Arabs
- Continued Western support of Israel seen bitterly by many Arabs
- Blame on U.N. for creation
2. Perceived Social Corruption of West
3. Western Attempts to Control Middle East
- 1953 coup in Iran of prime minister seen with hostility by many Iranians
4. Perceived “anti-Muslim Crusade” by U.S. and allies.
Arabs Toward Iran
• Many Arab Neighbors of Iran do Not See United States as a Threat
Gulf Cooperation Council (Kind of a Middle East NATO)
- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
- Weary of Iran for several reasons
1. History of Exporting Revolution makes governments nervous
2. Nuclear capability would give increased leverage in regional policy, intimidation
3. Environmental Concerns involving destabilizing nuclear disasters
4. Don’t want a Israel-Iran conflict. Can’t demand stop to Iran when Israel
5. U.S. military action unpopular with nationals. Possibility of lashing out at neighbors
• Israel will not likely allow Iran to gain nukes without fight
• In case of conflict other Arab states likely neutral, at least officially
• Fall of Taliban and Saddam creates power vacume
• Danger of Israeli and Iran conflict
IV. U.N. Attitude Toward Iran
September 25- Iranian President Vows to Ignore Security Council Measures
1. Stated agreement has been reached with IAEA and matter is now closed. (Definitely Not)
2. Stated will not follow resolutions of Security Council claiming it is a pawn of the “Arrogant Powers”
3. West seeking broader sanctions
4. Ahmadinejad makes big attack on U.S. culture.
5. Still wishes to see Israel gone though claims through peaceful means. (yeah right)
September 27- Iranian-IAEA agreement details.
- Essentially this agreement states the plan and order for the IAEA and Iran to resolve all of their outstanding issues in terms of unanswered questions.
- The agreement states that after the process outline within is finished the IAEA will have no further problems with the Iranian nuclear program.
- This essentially means, assuming the Iranians follow through and/or aren’t doing something behind the IAEA’s back, that the U.N. and U.S. lose their credibility in attacking Iran economically, militarily, and politically.
- Report might not hold back U.S. claiming rumors of foul play
• Prior to IAEA found Iran to be holding back and behaving suspiciously
• Fear that other countries will follow example
• Split in support between economic supporter of Iran, primarily Russia and China, which has traditionally paralyzed U.N.
• However, Iran’s cheating of the NPT has created a more unified opinion within the U.N. (treaty)
U.N. Structure
General Assembly
- All nations have 1 vote.
- Overseeing Operations
- Considering non-binding resolutions on international issues
- Elects members of Security Council (not nations)
Security Council
- Maintaining International Peace
- Authorizing Economic and Military Sanctions
- Approving Use of Force to restore peace
- Choices of nations to ensure that every council decision was supported by globe’s strongest nations.
Large Reasons for Ineffectiveness of U.N.
- Different Superpowers supporting opposing sides
- One superpower vetoes parts of intervention and missions become to narrowly defined.
- Many Instances of American or NATO led aggressive plans getting the job done where U.N. doesn’t: Kosovo, Bosnia,
- Going into Iraq without U.N. approval severely discredited
- Many peacekeeping missions are abandoned after minimal losses
More Effective Method of Peacekeeping
1. Superpower goes in and puts down opposition
2. Peacekeepers come in after to keep the peace
• Suggestions for Permanent Peace Keeping Force to make peacekeeping operations better funded and more able to rapidly respond.
• Opponents state wouldn’t work unless backed by superpowers and when superpowers are aligned it’s unnecessary anyway.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) (UN Nuclear Watchdog)
- Nations seeking nuclear capabilities must follow certain safeguards and allow IAEA inspections to ensure lack of weapons development.
- Many nations doing it in secret or in spite of.
- Too openhanded.
V. U.S. Attitude Toward Iran
• U.S. policy of not negotiating with those it considers terrorists has not always held true.
• Important to bear in mind that radicals are a minority
• Past attempts to resolve issues indicate that some Iranians at least wish to go into talks with the U.S.
• Current situation in Middle East has emboldened Iran
Intelligence on Iran
• Difficult do to atmosphere in Iran
• Several Methods Known
1. Iranians in other Arab Countries
2. General Intelligence from other countries
3. Intelligence from American Allies in and around region
4. Captured Insurgents or Iranian detainees
5. Iranian Exiles (Chalabis)
Criticism
• Scattered
• U.S. Intel failure in Iraq
• Closely resembles said lack of intel
• Difficulty Understanding Iranian decision making apparatus
• Hard to tell who has a hand in what
• Important is officials making good policy decisions based on limited intelligence
VI. Iranian Influence on Iraq
Iranian Goals in Iraq
- Iran has close ties to many prominent Shia militias in Iraq
5 Theoretical Iranian Goals for Iraq
• Prevent the emergence of an Iraq dominated by Arab-Sunnis that might threaten Iran.
• Promote Iran’s economic and religious interests in Iraq (several Shia holy shrines are located in Iraq).
• Prevent the emergence of a separate independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Such a state might encourage the Kurds in Iran to follow suit.
• Prevent a decisive US victory. Such an outcome would improve the US image in the Middle East and could encourage Washington to repeat the experience of “regime change” in Iran. Keeping American troops fighting in Iraq reduces the chances of a US attack on Iran.
• Prevent a full-scale civil war in Iraq. Such a war would threaten the Shia influence inside Iraq, destabilize Iran, and antagonize surrounding Sunni-Arab states.
• Iranian President states chaos in Iraq is bad for Iran as it is their neighbor and Shiite government already in place. States U.S. is looking for a scapegoat.
• Iraq severely uncomfortable with tensions
VII. Iran’s Nuclear Program
• See Iranian-IAEA agreements in U.N. view of Iran section
• Iran has shown a tendency to defy U.N. and IAEA mandates as well as a history of supporting terrorist groups which combines to make everyone nervous about their nuclear intentions
• U.N. waiting on November IAEA report
• Development of nuclear weapons is not strategically very intelligent for Iran right now which makes their behavior all the more troubling
• Iran has defied the NPT treaty which it signed which demands that countries seeking nuclear power must be transparent
VIII. Effect of International Pressure on Iran
• Hard to tell with lack of knowledge of life in Iran
Several Possible Theories
1. Iranian government fully committed to winning international standoff
2. Reemergence of liberal power in response to failure of current government
3. Iran being backed into corner makes more dangerous and prone to rash action
Possible Outcomes
I. Conflict (Could become necessary)
II. Peace (Obviously preferred option)
Effects on American People
I. If peace not much of effect. Focus still on Iraq
II. Many consequences if conflict such as
- Higher deficit
- Suffering of Economy
- Draft
- Increased international anger towards Americans
This will be difficult to read, but the syllabus said post it so here it is. My word version is a lot prettier and easier to look at. This was a useful step because I had to go through my research notes so far and start pulling out the main points. The result is this condensed version of my research notes which are more than twice as long as this. My next steps will be structuring my paper's argument using this information.
I. Iranian Government
A. Structure
Faqih/Supreme Leader (Chief of State) (Essentially elected dictator)
- Must be religious but more importantly politically capable
- Elected by popularly elected religious nationalist “Assembly of Experts”
- Appoints Chief of Judiciary and controls directly
Assembly of Experts (Kind of like electoral college)
- Popularly Elected
- Tested for religious learning and commitment to Islamic Republic
- Must be approved by Guardians Council
President (Replaced Prime Minister) (Second Man) (Public spokesman)
- More power than before
- Subject to faqih in all critical state, security, and foreign policy matters
Guardian Council (just under faqih)
- Religious overseeing council
- 12 appointed (supreme leader) members divided equally between clerics and lay scholars.
- Judicial review and veto power
- Conservative religious watchdog
- Judges the qualifications of those who stand for election to legislative bodies
Discretionary Council
- Resolves disputes between Guardian Council, parliament, and executive branch
- Thirty members appointed by supreme leader
- Resolves issues between ruling powers
• Supreme Leader has enormous power
• Remarkably kin to U.S. in that checks-n-balances and democratic. Chief difference non-separation of church and state and great power to one person.
• Very doubtful anything happens without faqih go ahead or he would crack down on it.
Current Leadership
President → Mahamoud Ahmadinejad
- Extremely anti-West and anti-Israel
- Very overconfident
- May not have support of Iranian government
Current Government
Four Professed Goals at Start
1. Social Justice (opinion)(likely no)
2. Economic Self Sufficiency (failed)
3. Good Economy (opinion/not much change/likely worse)
4. Freedom from Influence of Foreign Powers (Likely succeeding but causes other areas to suffer.
Main View From Revolution: Militant
- Political and cultural revolution
- Theocratic state ruled by and for the clerics
- Violence legitimate means to the ultimate goal
- Supreme Leader
• There are liberal minds which would likely support westernized society but repressed by government.
• Possible Dual reality: Public rigid/Private western
II. Iranian Military
* Roughly Four Branches
* Estimated around 550,000- 600,000
1. Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Established by the clerics, first loyalty to the clerics
- Transformed zealot revolutionary militias into military force accountable only to clerics
• 125,00 Strongish
• Secures revolutionary regime
• Provides training support to terrorist groups abroad
• Formed in 1978 revolution
• Operates independently of Regular Armed Forces (though lots of joint operations)
- Constitution gives IRGC responsibility of “preserving the Revolution”
- Also serves as enforcers for Islamic codes/moralities
- Iranian SS
- Runs certain businesses and social institutions
Military Capabilities
- Consists of ground, naval, and aviation troops (well rounded)
- Air forces negligible, most new aircraft go to regular Air Force
- Navy mostly small guerilla patrol boats
- Political influence as well
* Essentially Iran’s Proxy Training and support force
2. Regular Army
- First loyalty to country and government
- About 350,000
Composition
1. Four Corps
2. Four Armored Divisions
3. Six Infantry Divisions
4. Two commando brigades
5. One Airborne Brigade
6. Other smaller independent formations:
- Several small armor units
- An Infantry Brigade
- An Airborne Brigade
- Two or Three special forces brigades
- Five artillery brigade/regiments
- Coastal defense units
- Air Defense Groups
- Between four and six army aviation units
- Logistics and supply units
- Different organization in each division
- Some not well equipped
- Decent Number of Tanks
- High Number of combat helicopters
3. Iranian Navy
• Smallest service
• About 20,000 men mostly riflemen and marines
• Five Major Zones
1. Three on Persian Gulf (Main)
2. One on Caspian Sea (tiny)
3. One on Indian Ocean
• Three battalions of marines
• Entirely of Foreign Origin
• Largest Hovercraft fleets in the world (shallow Persian Gulf waters)
• Suffered a great deal after withdrawal of Western suppliers (spare parts and maintenance)
• Mostly supplied by Eastern sources now: Russia, China
• Mostly small, high speed boats
• Poorly equipped and largely out of action
• Large number of sea mines
4. Iranian Air Force
• Also hard hit by military sanctions
• Around 100,000 personnel
• Started with decent air force but heavily degraded
• Most planes and equipment come from Russia and China
Defense Industry
• Small: mostly ground force equipment
• Growing Air production
• Still Largely Reliant on Foreign Market
• New turn toward Russia and China markets for arms (big demand)
• All services negatively effected by withdrawal from western resources specifically Air Force and Navy
• Considered Unorganized
• Attempts to make up for lacking areas with good missile and rocket capabilities
• Basij- Essentially National Guard. Trained by Revolutionary Guards so would probably fight like insurgency. Could be very dangerous in an occupation.
Supreme National Security Council
• Institution established with an aim to watch over the Islamic Revolution and safeguard the IRI’s national interests as well as sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Iranian Constitution lays out three responsibilities of SNSC
1. Determine defense/security policies within the framework of general policies laid down by the faqih.
2. Coordinates all activities related to defense/security.
3. Decides how all resources will be used for facing threats (international and domestic.
• President is Chairman of council and subcommittees
• Faqih makes all final calls
Members of SNSC
1. Heads of Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary
2. Chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces
3. Official in charge of the Plan an Budget Organization (head treasurer)
4. Two representatives of faqih
5. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Intelligence
6. A minister concerned with the subject and the highest authorities of the Army and the IRGC
• Reports show that military commanders are not idiots and have been known to ignore unsound advice from inexperienced religious/SNSC reps.
• Two chains of command below SNSC
1. Admin
2. Operational
III. Relationship Between Iran And Nearby Countries
Tension with Israel
Reasons
1. Support of Hezbollah
2. Promised Destruction
3. Stated no intention to attack Israel
Recent War Between IDF and Hezbollah
1. Iran emboldened. Seeing tactics work. (Other Arabs see as well)
2. Might be pissed because Hezbollah fired off most rockets
Arab Resentment Toward West
1. Israel
- Basic eviction of Palestinians and emplacement of Israel is very unpopular amongst Arabs
- Continued Western support of Israel seen bitterly by many Arabs
- Blame on U.N. for creation
2. Perceived Social Corruption of West
3. Western Attempts to Control Middle East
- 1953 coup in Iran of prime minister seen with hostility by many Iranians
4. Perceived “anti-Muslim Crusade” by U.S. and allies.
Arabs Toward Iran
• Many Arab Neighbors of Iran do Not See United States as a Threat
Gulf Cooperation Council (Kind of a Middle East NATO)
- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE
- Weary of Iran for several reasons
1. History of Exporting Revolution makes governments nervous
2. Nuclear capability would give increased leverage in regional policy, intimidation
3. Environmental Concerns involving destabilizing nuclear disasters
4. Don’t want a Israel-Iran conflict. Can’t demand stop to Iran when Israel
5. U.S. military action unpopular with nationals. Possibility of lashing out at neighbors
• Israel will not likely allow Iran to gain nukes without fight
• In case of conflict other Arab states likely neutral, at least officially
• Fall of Taliban and Saddam creates power vacume
• Danger of Israeli and Iran conflict
IV. U.N. Attitude Toward Iran
September 25- Iranian President Vows to Ignore Security Council Measures
1. Stated agreement has been reached with IAEA and matter is now closed. (Definitely Not)
2. Stated will not follow resolutions of Security Council claiming it is a pawn of the “Arrogant Powers”
3. West seeking broader sanctions
4. Ahmadinejad makes big attack on U.S. culture.
5. Still wishes to see Israel gone though claims through peaceful means. (yeah right)
September 27- Iranian-IAEA agreement details.
- Essentially this agreement states the plan and order for the IAEA and Iran to resolve all of their outstanding issues in terms of unanswered questions.
- The agreement states that after the process outline within is finished the IAEA will have no further problems with the Iranian nuclear program.
- This essentially means, assuming the Iranians follow through and/or aren’t doing something behind the IAEA’s back, that the U.N. and U.S. lose their credibility in attacking Iran economically, militarily, and politically.
- Report might not hold back U.S. claiming rumors of foul play
• Prior to IAEA found Iran to be holding back and behaving suspiciously
• Fear that other countries will follow example
• Split in support between economic supporter of Iran, primarily Russia and China, which has traditionally paralyzed U.N.
• However, Iran’s cheating of the NPT has created a more unified opinion within the U.N. (treaty)
U.N. Structure
General Assembly
- All nations have 1 vote.
- Overseeing Operations
- Considering non-binding resolutions on international issues
- Elects members of Security Council (not nations)
Security Council
- Maintaining International Peace
- Authorizing Economic and Military Sanctions
- Approving Use of Force to restore peace
- Choices of nations to ensure that every council decision was supported by globe’s strongest nations.
Large Reasons for Ineffectiveness of U.N.
- Different Superpowers supporting opposing sides
- One superpower vetoes parts of intervention and missions become to narrowly defined.
- Many Instances of American or NATO led aggressive plans getting the job done where U.N. doesn’t: Kosovo, Bosnia,
- Going into Iraq without U.N. approval severely discredited
- Many peacekeeping missions are abandoned after minimal losses
More Effective Method of Peacekeeping
1. Superpower goes in and puts down opposition
2. Peacekeepers come in after to keep the peace
• Suggestions for Permanent Peace Keeping Force to make peacekeeping operations better funded and more able to rapidly respond.
• Opponents state wouldn’t work unless backed by superpowers and when superpowers are aligned it’s unnecessary anyway.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) (UN Nuclear Watchdog)
- Nations seeking nuclear capabilities must follow certain safeguards and allow IAEA inspections to ensure lack of weapons development.
- Many nations doing it in secret or in spite of.
- Too openhanded.
V. U.S. Attitude Toward Iran
• U.S. policy of not negotiating with those it considers terrorists has not always held true.
• Important to bear in mind that radicals are a minority
• Past attempts to resolve issues indicate that some Iranians at least wish to go into talks with the U.S.
• Current situation in Middle East has emboldened Iran
Intelligence on Iran
• Difficult do to atmosphere in Iran
• Several Methods Known
1. Iranians in other Arab Countries
2. General Intelligence from other countries
3. Intelligence from American Allies in and around region
4. Captured Insurgents or Iranian detainees
5. Iranian Exiles (Chalabis)
Criticism
• Scattered
• U.S. Intel failure in Iraq
• Closely resembles said lack of intel
• Difficulty Understanding Iranian decision making apparatus
• Hard to tell who has a hand in what
• Important is officials making good policy decisions based on limited intelligence
VI. Iranian Influence on Iraq
Iranian Goals in Iraq
- Iran has close ties to many prominent Shia militias in Iraq
5 Theoretical Iranian Goals for Iraq
• Prevent the emergence of an Iraq dominated by Arab-Sunnis that might threaten Iran.
• Promote Iran’s economic and religious interests in Iraq (several Shia holy shrines are located in Iraq).
• Prevent the emergence of a separate independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Such a state might encourage the Kurds in Iran to follow suit.
• Prevent a decisive US victory. Such an outcome would improve the US image in the Middle East and could encourage Washington to repeat the experience of “regime change” in Iran. Keeping American troops fighting in Iraq reduces the chances of a US attack on Iran.
• Prevent a full-scale civil war in Iraq. Such a war would threaten the Shia influence inside Iraq, destabilize Iran, and antagonize surrounding Sunni-Arab states.
• Iranian President states chaos in Iraq is bad for Iran as it is their neighbor and Shiite government already in place. States U.S. is looking for a scapegoat.
• Iraq severely uncomfortable with tensions
VII. Iran’s Nuclear Program
• See Iranian-IAEA agreements in U.N. view of Iran section
• Iran has shown a tendency to defy U.N. and IAEA mandates as well as a history of supporting terrorist groups which combines to make everyone nervous about their nuclear intentions
• U.N. waiting on November IAEA report
• Development of nuclear weapons is not strategically very intelligent for Iran right now which makes their behavior all the more troubling
• Iran has defied the NPT treaty which it signed which demands that countries seeking nuclear power must be transparent
VIII. Effect of International Pressure on Iran
• Hard to tell with lack of knowledge of life in Iran
Several Possible Theories
1. Iranian government fully committed to winning international standoff
2. Reemergence of liberal power in response to failure of current government
3. Iran being backed into corner makes more dangerous and prone to rash action
Possible Outcomes
I. Conflict (Could become necessary)
II. Peace (Obviously preferred option)
Effects on American People
I. If peace not much of effect. Focus still on Iraq
II. Many consequences if conflict such as
- Higher deficit
- Suffering of Economy
- Draft
- Increased international anger towards Americans
This will be difficult to read, but the syllabus said post it so here it is. My word version is a lot prettier and easier to look at. This was a useful step because I had to go through my research notes so far and start pulling out the main points. The result is this condensed version of my research notes which are more than twice as long as this. My next steps will be structuring my paper's argument using this information.
D9HW3 Writing Reflection
To complete this assignment I first looked at my previous annotated bibliograpny assignments. I took out the ones that I knew I wasn't going to use and put the rest together into my draft. I then went through with a fine tooth comb and fixed the errors I could find, specifically with the citations. I also peer reviewed some classmates assignments as welll as read the reviews by other students on my own assignment. This gave me more ideas on how to improve my writing project. After taking all these things into account and putting my assignment through a spelling and grammar check I was finished. One thing I liked about my method here was my organization. As I did research I took notes and I kept those notes in an organized format. This helped me with this assignment primarily by showing where I was lacking in information and thus helped me decide what subject to research next. I don't really have any big concerns with this project outside of some formatting and other simple errors. If I had more time to work on this project I'd probably just spend it doing more research and adding more sources as my project is big and I need to do big research to get it right. One thing I definitely improved on here are my MLA citations (I hope). I spent alot of time learning about them and going through my own and others. Now my bibliography is done and I can focus primarily on my format and argument for WP3. Right now I'm trying to condense my notes and get them in order. I'm also trying to think through them so that I can proceed on with the last part of my research question which basically involve alot of educated guessing. I wish I had a little more time for this as I would have liked to fit in some more research.
Thursday, October 18, 2007
D8HW6 Deadline Reflection
This week was... wait for it... BUSY! Who would have thought. I don't know how many of these surprises my old heart can take. Looking through my classmates writing projects was informative but also a little shocking. It showed me the importance of self review of an assignment. It also showed me that it is important to read the assignment prompts in the syllabus and follow them or else you end up doing your assignment all wrong. The classroom discussions and activities were interesting as they gave me some insight into the thinking processes of some of my classmates as well as reminding me of the importance of structure in an argument. Reading and responding to my classmates blog postings helped me get an idea of their reaction to what we learned in class as well as giving me some useful information for WP2.
I responded to:
Jeff Fitzwater
d8hw4
Coralee Harding
D#8, HW#6, Deadline Reflection
Kathy Lacey
D#8, HW#3, Peer Review Reflection
Brennan Dardis
Deadline #8 HW#5
I responded to:
Jeff Fitzwater
d8hw4
Coralee Harding
D#8, HW#6, Deadline Reflection
Kathy Lacey
D#8, HW#3, Peer Review Reflection
Brennan Dardis
Deadline #8 HW#5
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